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Abstract. We introduce the notion of distributed password-based public-key cryptography, where a virtual
high-entropy private key is implicitly de￿ned as a concatenation of low-entropy passwords held in separate
locations. The users can jointly perform private-key operations by exchanging messages over an arbitrary
channel, based on their respective passwords, without ever sharing their passwords or reconstituting the key.
Focusing on the case of ElGamal encryption as an example, we start by formally de￿ning ideal functionalities
for distributed public-key generation and virtual private-key computation in the UC model. We then construct
e￿cient protocols that securely realize them in either the RO model (for e￿ciency) or the CRS model (for
elegance).
We conclude by showing that our distributed protocols generalize to a broad class of ￿discrete-log￿-based
public-key cryptosystems, which notably includes identity-based encryption. This opens the door to a powerful
extension of IBE with a virtual PKG made of a group of people, each one memorizing a small portion of the
master key.
1 Introduction
Traditional wisdom says that it is impossible to do public-key cryptography from short passwords. This is
because any low-entropy private key will quickly succumb to an o￿-line dictionary attack, made possible
by the very publication of the public key, which can thus be used as a non-interactive test function. Since
o￿-line attacks are very e￿ective against weak secrets, it is imperative that the private keys in public-key
systems be highly random and complex, but that makes them hopelessly impossible to be remembered by
humans.
But, what if, instead of being held as an indivisible entity, the private key were chopped into many little
pieces, each one of them independently memorized by a di￿erent person in a group of friends or colleagues?
The components of the key would be safe in the respective memories of the individual group members, at
least as long as it is not used. The only complication is the need to reassemble the full private key from the
various components, so that private-key operations can be performed. Naturally, the secret holders should
not actually reassemble the key, but instead perform a distributed computation of whichever private-key
operation they need, without ever having to meet or even reconstitute the key.
Unusual Requirements. Even if one can perform private-key computations without reassembling the
key, there are other, more subtle vulnerabilities.
For starters, we cannot simply assume that the (virtual) private key is simply made of some number of
random components (one per user) generated independently and uniformly at random. On the contrary,
we must assume that the various components are arbitrary and possibly correlated, and some of them
potentially very weak and easily guessable. This is because of our requirement of human-memorability:
for the components to be truly memorable, it is imperative that their respective owners choose them in
whichever way they please.
A consequence of the above is that it also opens the possibility of password reuse by the various users:
although this is a bad security practice that should be discouraged, it is also one that is very common and
that we should acknowledge and handle the best way we can, rather than pretend that it will not happen.
Additionally, since the various secret holders do not necessarily trust each other, it is necessary that
they be able to choose their individual secrets in complete privacy. In fact, any solution to our question must
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of the remaining honest users.
Finally, we must have a notion of ￿group leader￿, which is the person who will actually ￿own￿ the
distributed virtual private key. By ￿own￿, we mean that only the group leader will be able to use that key,
i.e., obtain the results of any private computation based on it, with the help of the other group members.
We stress that neither the leader nor anyone else should actually learn the key itself.
An important di￿erence between our requirements and essentially all existing distributed protocols
that deal with weak secrets (such as Group Password-based Key Agreement), is that here the secrets are
chosen arbitrarily and privately by each user. We neither assume that all the secrets are the same (as in
Group PAKE), or that they are all independent (as in Threshold Cryptography). The whole system should
thus: (1) not fall apart if some of the passwords become exposed, as long as the combined entropy of the
uncompromised passwords remains high; (2) preserve the privacy of all uncompromised passwords at all
stages of the process (during the initial computation of the public key and any subsequent utilization of
the virtual private key).
The notion of group leader is something necessary for our application. Most password-based protocols
seek to achieve a symmetric outcome Here, by contrast, the impetus to create a public/private key pair
must originate in a particular user, who will become the leader, and who seeks the help of other, semi-
trusted individuals to help him or her remember the key. (The leader can return the favor later or share
the result of any private computation, outside of the core protocol.) Remark also that whereas it is easy
for the leader to share the result of a private computation with the other members, it would be almost
impossible to restrict such result to the leader if the computation gave the result to all.
General Approach. The aim of this paper is thus primarily to show how to do asymmetric cryptography
from a distributed set of human-memorable secrets. Since public-key cryptography from single passwords
is irremediably insecure, the best we can hope for is to base it on moderately-sized distributed collections
of them: Given a regular system (such as signature, encryption, or IBE), we devise a pair of protocols that
take independent user passwords as inputs, and, in a distributed manner: 1) generate a publishable public
key that corresponds to the set of passwords; 2) do private computations on the virtual private key.
To create a key pair, a group of players led by a designated ￿group leader￿ engages in the distributed
key generation protocol. The protocol runs over unauthenticated channels, and if all goes well, results in
an explicit public key for anyone to see and use. The private key is not explicitly computed and remains
implicitly de￿ned by the set of passwords. To use the private key, the same group of players engages in
another protocol, using the same passwords as in the key generation protocol. The protocol again runs
over unauthenticated channels. If all goes well, the leader, and only the leader, obtains the results of the
computation. Again, the private key is not explicitly computed, and the passwords remain private to their
respective owners.
Unlike regular public-key cryptosystems, the private key is never stored or used all at once; it remains
virtual and delocalized, and the private-key operation is done using an interactive protocol. But unlike
threshold cryptography, where the shares are uniformly randomized and typically as long as the shared
secret itself, here the passwords are arbitrary and user-selected. Unlike password-based encryption, o￿-line
attacks are thwarted by virtue of the high joint entropy from many distinct user passwords, which must
be guessed all at once. On-line attacks against single passwords cannot be prevented, but are very slow as
they require an on-line commitment for each guess. Unlike password-authenticated key exchange protocols ,
here the user passwords are not the same or even related to each other: the passwords are truly personal.
Our Results. First, we formalize this class of protocols and their security requirements; for convenience
we do so in the UC model [12], which lends itself nicely to the analysis of password-based protocols.
Second, we propose a reasonably e￿cient construction for the ElGamal cryptosystem as a working exam-
ple [19], which we prove secure both in the RO and CRS models. Third, we conclude by showing that
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notably, the whole set of schemes derived from the BF and BB identity-based cryptosystems [9,7].
Even though for simplicity we focus on public-key systems with a special form (those that operate by
raising elements of an algebraic group to the power of the private key and/or ephemeral exponents), this
structure is general enough to capture many examples of exponentiation-based cryptosystems, and even
IBE systems that require a pairing, as we just mentioned.
Remarkably, and of independent interest, this gives us an interesting twist on the notion of IBE, where
the ￿central￿ key generation authority is replaced by a distributed set of users, each one of them holding
a small piece of the master secret in the form of a self-selected easily memorable short password.
Related Work. Although there is no prior work on distributed cryptography from weak secrets proper,
this notion is of course related to a fairly large body of literature that includes Password-Authenticated
Key Exchange (PAKE) and Multi-Party Computation (MPC).
Multi-Party Computation. The ￿rst and most famous MPC protocol is due to Yao [31]. Depending
on the setup, such protocols allow two participants with secret inputs to compute a public function of their
joint inputs, without leaking anything other than the output of the function [25,24,6,16]. MPC protocols
typically assume all communications between the players to be authentic: that is, an external mechanism
precludes modi￿cations or fake message insertions. The ￿ip side is that such protocols tend to become
insecure when the number of dishonest players reaches a certain threshold that allows them to take over
the computation and from there recover the other players’ inputs [29,2,26].
Several works have dealt with the case of MPC over unauthenticated channels [13,20,1], by prefacing
the multi-party computation proper with some ￿avor of authentication based on non-malleable commit-
ments or signatures [18]. The work of Barak et al. [1] in particular gives general conditions of what can
and cannot be achieved in unauthenticated multi-party computations: they show that an adversary is
always able to partition the set of players into disjoint ￿islands￿ that end up performing independent com-
putations, but nothing else besides dropping messages and/or relaying them faithfully. They show how to
transform any (realization of an) UC functionality into a multi-party version of the same that merely lets
the adversary split the players into disjoint islands. They also show how to build password-based group
key agreement (GPAKE) from this notion, ￿rst by creating a random session key for the group by running
an MPC protocol without authentication, and then by verifying that all players have the same key using
a ￿string equality￿ functionality. (By comparison, here, we force the users to commit to their passwords
￿rst, and then perform the actual computation based on those commitments.)
Although it is clear that, like so many other things in cryptography, our work can be viewed as
a special case of unauthenticated MPC, our contribution lies not in this obvious conceptual step, but
in the speci￿cation of suitable functionalities for the non-trivial problem of password-based threshold
cryptography (and their e￿cient implementation). In particular, much grief arises from our requirement
that each user has its own password (which may even be reused in other contexts), instead of a single
common password for the whole group as in the applications considered in [1] and elsewhere.
On-line Passwords. The ￿rst insight that weak passwords could be used on-line (in a key exchange
protocol) with relative impunity was made in [5]. It captured the idea that the success of an adversary
in breaking the protocol should be proportional to the number of times this adversary interacts with the
server, and only negligibly in its o￿-line computing capabilities.
In the password-only scenario (without public-key infrastructure), the ￿rst protocols with a proof of
security appeared contemporaneously in [11] and [3], both in the random-oracle model. A (somewhat
ine￿cient) protocol without any setup assumption was ￿rst proposed in [23]. A fairly e￿cient one in the
common random string model was ￿rst given in [27] and generalized in [22].
To cope with concurrent sessions, the work of [14] was the ￿rst to propose an ideal functionality for
PAKE in the UC model, as well as a protocol that securely realizes it. Unlike previous models, one of the
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also considers, for instance, some realistic scenarios such as participants running the protocol with di￿erent
but possibly related passwords.
2 Security Model
The UC Framework. Throughout this paper, we assume basic familiarity with the universal compos-
ability (UC) framework [12]. See Appendix A for a short introduction of some UC notions we shall use in
this work.
Split Functionalities. Without any strong authentication mechanisms, the adversary A can always
partition the players into disjoint subgroups and execute independent sessions of the protocol with each
one, playing the role of the other players. Such an attack is unavoidable since players cannot distinguish
the case in which they interact with each other from the case where they interact with A. The authors
of [1] addressed this issue by proposing a new model based on split functionalities which guarantees that
this attack is the only one available to A.
The split functionality is a generic construction based upon an ideal functionality: Its description can
be found on Figure 1. In the initialization stage, the adversary A adaptively chooses disjoint subsets of the
honest parties (with a unique session identi￿er that is ￿xed for the duration of the protocol). During the
computation, each subset H activates a separate instance of the functionality F. All these functionality
instances are independent: The executions of the protocol for each subset H can only be related in the
way A chooses the inputs of the players it controls. The parties Pi 2 H provide their own inputs and
receive their own outputs, whereas A plays the role of all the parties Pj = 2 H.
Given a functionality F, the split functionality sF proceeds as follows:
Initialization:
￿ Upon receiving (Init;sid) from party Pi, send (Init;sid;Pi) to the adversary.
￿ Upon receiving a message (Init;sid;Pi;H;sidH) from A, where H is a set of party identities, check that Pi has already
sent (Init;sid) and that for all recorded (H
0;sidH0), either H = H
0 and sidH = sidH0 or H and H
0 are disjoint and
sidH 6= sidH0. If so, record the paire (H;sidH), send (Init;sid;sidH) to Pi, and invoke a new functionality (F;sidH)
denoted as FH and with set of honest parties H.
Computation:
￿ Upon receiving (Input;sid;m) from party Pi, ￿nd the set H such that Pi 2 H and forward m to FH.
￿ Upon receiving (Input;sid;Pj;H;m) from A, such that Pj = 2 H, forward m to FH as if coming from Pj.
￿ When FH generates an output m for party Pi 2 H, send m to Pi. If the output is for Pj = 2 H or for the adversary,
send m to the adversary.
Fig.1. Split Functionality sF
In the sequel, as we describe our two general functionalities FpwDistPublicKeyGen and FpwDistPrivateComp,
one has to keep in mind that an attacker controlling the communication channels can always choose to
view them as the split functionalities sFpwDistPublicKeyGen and sFpwDistPrivateComp implicitly consisting of
multiple instances of FpwDistPublicKeyGen and FpwDistPrivateComp for non-overlapping subsets of the original
players. Furthermore, one cannot prevent A from keeping some ￿ows, which will never arrive. This is
modelled in our functionalities (Figures 2 and 3) by a bit b, which speci￿es whether the ￿ow is really sent
or not.
The Ideal Functionalities. In the sequel we denote by n the number of users involved in a given
execution of the protocol. One of the users plays a particular role and is denoted as the group leader, the
others are simply denoted as players. Groups can be formed arbitrarily. Each group is de￿ned by its leader
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number of other players in a speci￿c order (who ￿assist￿ and ￿authorize￿ the leader in his or her use of the
group’s virtual key).
We stress that the composition and ordering of a group is what de￿nes it and cannot be changed: this
ensures that any third-party who uses the group’s public key knows exactly how the corresponding private
key will be accessed. If another player wants to be the leader, he or she will have to form a new group.
(Even though such new group may contain the same set of members with possibly unchanged passwords,
the two groups will be distinct and have di￿erent incompatible key pairs because of the di￿erent ordering).
As in [14], the functionality is not in charge of providing the passwords to the participants. The
passwords are chosen by the environment which then hands them to the parties as inputs. This guarantees
security even in the case where a honest user executes the protocol with an incorrect password: This models,
for instance, the case where a user mistypes its password. It also implies that the security is preserved for
all password distributions (not necessarily the uniform one) and in all situations where related passwords
are used in di￿erent protocols.
Since the functionalities are intended to capture distributed password protocols for (the key generation
and private-key operation of) an arbitrary public-key primitive, we will represent all the primitive’s algo-
rithms as black box parameters in our de￿nitions. In general, we shall require: a function SecretKeyGen
to combine a vector of passwords into a single secret key; a function PublicKeyGen to compute from a
password vector a matching public key; a predicate PublicKeyVer to verify such public key against any
password vector: this is important for the correctness of the ideal functionalities, but it also simpli￿es the
use of the joint-state UC Theorem since it abstracts away the passwords that then do not need to be
considered as part of the joint data; a function PrivateComp to perform the operation of interest using
the private key: this could be the decryption function Dec of a public-key encryption scheme, the signing
function Sign in a signature scheme, or the identity-based key extraction function Extract in an IBE system.
Both functionalities start with an initialization step, which basically waits for all the users to notify
their interest in computing a public key or performing a private computation, as the case may be. Such
noti￿cation is provided via newSession queries (containing the session identi￿er sid of the instance of the
protocol, the user’s identity Pi, the identity of the group Pid, the user’s password pwi, and when computing
the private function, a public key pk and input in) sent by the players or by the simulator S in case of
corruptions during the ￿rst ￿ow (corresponding to the split functionality). Once all the users (sharing the
same sid and Pid) have sent their noti￿cation message, the functionality informs the adversary that it is
ready to proceed.
In principle, after the initialization stage is over, the eligible users are ready to receive the result.
However the functionality waits for S to send a compute message before proceeding. This allows S to
decide the exact moment when the key should be sent to the users and, in particular, it allows S to choose
the exact moment when corruptions should occur (for instance S may decide to corrupt some party Pi
before the key is sent but after Pi decided to participate to a given session of the protocol; see [28]). Also,
although in the key generation functionality all users are normally eligible to receive the public key, in the
private computation functionality it is important that only the group leader receives the output (though
he may choose to reveal it afterwards to others, outside of the protocol, depending on the application).
The Distributed Key Generation Functionality (Figure 2). The aim of this functionality is to
provide a public key to the users, computed according to their passwords with respect to the previously
mentioned function PublicKeyGen given in parameter, and it ensures that the group leader never receives
an incorrect key in the end, whatever does the adversary. The protocol starts with an initialization phase
as already described, followed by a key computation phase triggered by an explicit key computation query
(so that S can control its timing.)
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PublicKeyGen : (pw1;pw2;:::;pwn) 7! pk that derives a public key pk from a set of passwords. Denote by role either
player or leader. The functionality interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P1,...,Pn via the following queries:
Initialization. Upon receiving a query (newSession;sid;Pid;Pi;pwi;role) from user Pi for the ￿rst time, where Pid is
a set of at least two distinct identities containing Pi, ignore it if role = leader and if there is already a record of the




If there are already jPidj   1 recorded tuples (sid;Pid;Pj;pwj) for Pj 2 Pid n fPig, and exactly one of them such that
role = leader, then while recording the jPidj-th tuple, also record (sid;Pid;ready) and send this to S. Otherwise, record
(sid;Pid;error) and send (sid;Pid;error) to S.
Key Computation. Upon receiving a message (compute;sid;Pid) from the adversary S where there is a recorded tuple
(sid;Pid;ready), then compute pk = PublicKeyGen(pw1;:::;pwn) and record (sid;Pid;pk).
Leader Key Delivery. Upon receiving a message (leaderDeliver;sid;Pid;b) from the adversary S for the ￿rst time, where
there is a recorded tuple (sid;Pid;pk) and a record (sid;Pid;Pi;pwi;leader), send (sid;Pid;pk) to Pi and to S if b = 1,
or (sid;Pid;error) otherwise. Record (sid;Pid;sent) and send this to S.
Player Key Delivery. Upon receiving (playerDeliver;sid;Pid;b;Pi) from the adversary S where there are recorded tuples
(sid;Pid;pk), (sid;Pid;Pi;pwi;player) and (sid;Pid;sent), send (sid;Pid;pk) to Pi if b = 1, or (sid;Pid;error) otherwise.
User Corruption. If S corrupts Pi 2 Pid where there is a recorded tuple (sid;Pid;Pi;pwi), then reveal pwi to S. If there
also is a recorded tuple (sid;Pid;pk) and if (sid;Pid;pk) has not yet been sent to Pi, send (sid;Pid;pk) to S.
Fig.2. The Distributed Key Generation Functionality FpwDistPublicKeyGen
After the key is computed, the adversary can choose whether the group leader indeed receives this
key. If delivery is denied, then nobody gets the key, and it is as if it was never computed. If delivery is
allowed, then the group leader and S both receive the public key. This behavior captures the fact that the
generated public key is intended to be available to all, starting with the opponent. (More to the point, this
requirement will also weed out some bogus protocols that could only be secure if the public key remained
unavailable to S.) Once they have received the public key, the other players may be allowed to receive it
too, according to a schedule chosen by S, and modeled by means of key delivery queries from S. Once S
asks to deliver the key to a player, the key is sent immediately.
Note that given the public key, if the adversary knows su￿ciently many passwords that the combined
entropy of the remaining passwords is low enough, he will be able to recover these remaining passwords by
brute force attack. This is unavoidable and explains the absence of any testPwd query in this functionality.
(This has nothing to do with the fact that our system is distributed: o￿-line attacks are always possible
in principle in public-key systems, and become feasible as soon as a su￿cient portion of the private key
becomes known.)
The Distributed Private Computation Functionality (Figure 3). The aim here is to perform a
private computation for the sole bene￿t of the group leader. The leader is responsible for the correctness
of the computation; in addition, it is the only user to receive the end result.
This functionality will thus compute a function of some supplied input in, depending on a set of pass-
words that must de￿ne a secret key corresponding to a given public key. More precisely, the functionality
will be able to check the compatibility of the passwords with the public key thanks to the veri￿cation func-
tion PublicKeyVer, and if it is correct it will then compute the secret key sk with the help of the function
SecretKeyGen, and from there evaluate PrivateComp(sk;in) and give the result to the leader. Note that
SecretKeyGen and PublicKeyVer are naturally related to the function PublicKeyGen called by the former
functionality. In all generality, unless SecretKeyGen and PublicKeyGen are both assumed to be determinis-
tic, we need the predicate PublicKeyVer in order to verify that a public key is ￿correct￿ without necessarily
being ￿equal￿ (to some canonical public key). Also note that the function SecretKeyGen is not assumed to
be injective, lest it unduly restrict the number of users and the total size of their passwords.
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PublicKeyVer : (pw1;pw2;:::;pwn;pk) 7! b, where b = 1 if the passwords and the public key are compatible, b = 0
otherwise. SecretKeyGen is a function SecretKeyGen : (pw1;pw2;:::;pwn) 7! sk, where sk is the secret key obtained from
the passwords. Finally, PrivateComp is a private-key function PrivateComp : (sk;c) 7! m, where sk is the secret key, c is the
function input (e.g., a ciphertext) and m the private result of the computation (e.g., the decrypted message). Denote by
role either player or leader. The functionality interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P1,...,Pn via the following
queries:
Initialization. Upon receiving a query (newSession;sid;Pid;Pi;pk;c;pwi;role) from user Pi for the ￿rst time, where Pid
is a set of at least two distinct identities containing Pi, ignore it if role = leader and if there is already a record of the
form (sid;Pid;;;;;leader). Record (sid;Pid;Pi;pk;c;pwi;role), mark it fresh, and send (sid;Pid;Pi;pk;c;role) to S.
Ignore any subsequent query (newSession;sid;Pid
0;;;;;) where Pid
0 6= Pid.
If there are already jPidj 1 recorded tuples (sid;Pid;Pi;pk;c;pwi;role), and exactly one of them such that role = leader,
then after recording the jPidj-th tuple, verify that the values of c and pk are the same for all the users. If the tuples do
not ful￿ll all of these conditions, report (sid;Pid;error) to S and stop. Otherwise, record (sid;Pid;pk;c;ready) and send it
to S. The group leader is Pj.
Password Test. Upon receiving a ￿rst query (testPwd;sid;Pid;fPi1;:::;Pilg;fpwi1;:::;pwilg) from S, if there ex-
ist l records (sid;Pid;Pik;pk;c;;), necessarily still marked fresh, and a record (sid;Pid;pk;c;ready), then denote
by pwjl+1;:::;pwjn the passwords of the other users of the group. If PublicKeyVer(pw1;:::;pwn;pk) = 1, edit the
records of Pi1;:::;Pil to be marked compromised and reply to S with ￿correct guess￿. Otherwise, mark the records
of the users Pi1;:::;Pil as interrupted and reply to S with ￿wrong guess￿. Ignore all subsequent queries of the
form (testPwd;sid;Pid;;).
Private Computation. Upon receiving a message (compute;sid;Pid) from S where there is a recorded tuple
(sid;Pid;pk;c;ready), then, if all records are fresh or compromised and PublicKeyVer(pw1;:::;pwn;pk) = 1, then com-
pute sk = SecretKeyGen(pw1;:::;pwn) and m = PrivateComp(sk;c), and store (sid;Pid;m); Next, for all Pi 2 Pid mark
the record (sid;Pid;Pi;pk;c;pwi;role) as complete. In any other case, store (sid;Pid;error). When the computation result
is set, report the outcome (either error or complete) to S.
Leader Computation Delivery. Upon receiving (leaderDeliver;sid;Pid;b) from S, where there is a recorded tuple
(sid;Pid;m) such that m 2 fwell-formed messagesg [ ferrorg, and there exists a record (sid;Pid;Pi;pk;c;pwi;leader),
send (sid;Pid;m) to Pi if b is equal to 1, or send (sid;Pid;error) if b is equal to 0. If the group leader Pi is corrupted or
compromised, then send (sid;Pid;m) to S as well (note that S gets m automatically if Pj is corrupted).
User Corruption. If S corrupts Pi 2 Pid where there is a recorded tuple (sid;Pid;Pi;pk;c;pwi;role), then reveal pwi
to S. If role = leader, if there also is a recorded tuple (sid;Pid;m), and if (sid;Pid;m) has not yet been sent to Pi, then
also send (sid;Pid;m) to S.
Fig.3. The Distributed Private Computation Functionality FpwDistPrivateComp
7Phases and Queries. During the initialization phase, each user is given as input a password pwi as
outlined earlier, but also an input in, and a public key pk. We stress that the security is guaranteed even
if the users do not share the same values for in and pk, because then the functionality fails directly at
the end of the initialization phase. At the end of this step, the adversary is also given knowledge of the
common in and pk (as these are supposedly public).
After this initialization step is over, but before the actual computation, the adversary S is given the
opportunity to make one or more simultaneous password guesses, by issuing a single Password Test query,
to model a ￿man-in-the-middle￿ impersonation attack against a subset of users. The query must indicate
the subset of user(s) targeted in the attack, and what password(s) S wishes to test for those user(s). If all
passwords are compatible with pk, the a￿ected users are marked as compromised, otherwise they are all
marked as interrupted. Una￿ected users remain marked as fresh. Observe that it is in the opponent’s best
interest to target only a single user in the Password Test query to optimize compromising probability.
Once the functionality receives a message of the form (compute;sid;Pid) from S, it proceeds to the
computation phase. This is done as follows. If (1) all records are fresh or compromised, and (2) the passwords
are compatible with the common public key pk, then the functionality computes the private key sk and
then the output out. In all other cases, no message is computed.
In any case, after the key generation, the functionality informs the adversary of the result, meaning that
S is told whether a message was actually computed or not. In particular, this means that the adversary
also learns whether the users’ passwords are compatible with pk or not. At ￿rst glance this may seem like a
critical information to provide to the adversary. We argue, however, that this is not the case in our setting.
Firstly, learning the status of the protocol (that is, whether it succeeded) without having any knowledge
of the passwords that went into it is completely pointless, and the only knowledge that the adversary may
have about those passwords are the ones it used in the testPwd impersonation query. Hence, as one should
expect, from the status of the protocol the only useful thing that the adversary can learn is whether the
password guesses it made were all good or not (as a single yes/no answer), but nothing else. Secondly,
even if the adversary could somehow derive more utility from the protocol status, modeling that status as
secret is not sensible because in most real-world scenarios it will be easy to infer from the users’ behavior.
At the end, and similarly to the ￿rst functionality, the ￿nal result can either be released to the group
leader, or withheld from it. However, this time, since the ￿nal result is a private output, there is no
provision to distribute it to the other players. Also, S only gets the message if the leader either has been
previously corrupted or if it is in the compromised state (either the leader has fallen under S’s control, or
S has successfully taken its place in the protocol).
Discussion. We emphasize that in this model only the leader and no other player receives the ￿nal
result. Although this has the advantage of making the construction simpler, it is also the most useful and
the only sensible choice. For starters, this makes our protocol much more resilient to password breaks in
on-line impersonation attacks. To see why, suppose that the ￿nal output were indeed sent to all users.
Then cracking the password of a single user would be all it took to break the system: adding more users
would actually decrease the overall on-line security, because with a larger group comes a greater chance
that some user will choose a weak password. By contrast, in the actual model, breaking the password
of an ordinary user has no dire consequence: the protocol security will simply continue to rest on the
passwords that remain. Since compromising ordinary users brings no other direct reward than to expose
their passwords, it is just as if broken passwords were removed from the key in future protocol executions,
or never contributed to it in the ￿rst place.
Of course, cracking the password of the leader will compromise the group and grant access to private
computations (with the help of the other players, still), but that is only natural since the leader ￿owns￿
the group. There is an important distinction between exposure of an ordinary player’s password and the
leader’s password: the leader represents the group with respect to third parties, i.e., when third parties
8use the group’s public key their intention is to communicate with the leader. By contrast, ordinary players
are not meant to be trusted and their inclusion to the group is a choice by the leader to help him or her
increase the security of the private key ￿ or leave it unchanged if that player turns out to be compromised
￿ but never decrease it.
Revocation. In case of compromise of the leader password, it is possible for the leader to ￿revoke￿
the group by instructing the other players to stop participating in that group (e.g., by using the group’s
resources one last time to sign a revocation certi￿cate using the group’s private key). This will prevent
any further use of the group’s resources, unless of course the adversary manages to crack all of the players’
passwords jointly. Such revocation mechanism falls outside of the protocol, so we do not model it in the
functionalities.
User Corruptions. Our de￿nition of the FpwDistPrivateComp functionality deals with user corruptions in a
way that is quite di￿erent to that of other password-based group protocols. E.g., in the group key exchange
functionality of [28], if the adversary has obtained the passwords of some participants (via password guesses
or user corruptions), it may freely set the resulting session key to any value. Here, our functionalities are
much more demanding in two important ways: ￿rst, S is much constrained in the way it can make and
test online password guesses; second, S can never alter the computation in any way once it has started.
Password Tests. The ￿rst di￿erence is that the testPwd query can only be asked once, early in the
protocol, and it does not actually test the password of the users, but rather the compatibility between
(1) the guessed passwords of any speci￿ed subset of users, (2) the real passwords of the rest of the group
(known by the functionality thanks to the newSession queries), and (3) the public key (which at this stage
is already guaranteed to be the same in all the users’ views). This unusual shape for the testPwd query
provides a very high level of security, because (A) at most a single set of password guesses can be tested
against any player in any protocol instance, and (B) if S chooses to test a set of more than one password
at once, then to cause a positive response all the guesses must be correct simultaneously (and since this
becomes exponentially unlikely, the astute adversary should be content to test sets of one password at a
time). After the private computation, all the records, initially fresh, compromised, or interrupted, become
either complete or error. No more testPwd query is accepted at this stage, because once the users have
completed their task it is too late for S to impersonate them (though corruption queries can still be made
to read their state). Note that one testPwd query is allowed for each instance of FpwDistPrivateComp, several
of which may be invoked by the split functionality sFpwDistPrivateComp.
Robustness. The second di￿erence with the model in [28] is that we do not grant the adversary
the right to alter the computation result when corrupting some users or learning some passwords. This
in particular means that either the group leader receives something coherent, or he receives an error; he
cannot receive something wrong, which makes the protocol robust. Robustness is actually automatic if we
make the assumption that the computation function PrivateComp is deterministic; for simplicity, this is
the setting of the generic protocol described in detail in this paper. At the end, however, we shall mention
some applications that require randomness in the computation. Without going into details, we can keep the
protocol robust by having all the parties commit to their random coins in the ￿rst round, in the same way
as they will also commit to their passwords (see below): this allows us to treat such coins as any regular
private input in the model, and hence forbid the adversary from modifying them once the computation
has started.
We remark that, although the adversary cannot spoof the computation, the environment does become
aware of the completion of the protocol, and hence could distinguish between the ideal and the real worlds
if the adversary won more often in one than the other. Such environmental awareness of the ￿nal state is of
course to be expected in reality, and so it is natural that our model should capture it. (Our implementation
will thus have to ensure that the success conditions are the same in both worlds.)
9Implicit Corruptions. Because we have a set of initially unauthenticated players communicating
over adversarially controlled channels, it is always possible for the adversary to partition the actual players
into isolated islands [1], and act on behalf of the complement of players with respect to each island. We
call this an implicit corruption, meaning that the adversary usurps the identity of a regular player (or
players) from the very start, before the key generation is even initiated. The adversary then sends the
newSession query on behalf of such implicitly corrupted players, who never really became corrupted but
always were the adversary. As mentioned previously, this situation is modeled in the ideal world by the
respective split functionalities sFpwDistPublicKeyGen and sFpwDistPrivateComp spawning one or more instances
of the normal functionalities FpwDistPublicKeyGen and FpwDistPrivateComp over disjoint sets of (actual) players,
as illustrated on Figure 1.
3 Protocol Description
The following protocol deals with a particular case of unauthenticated distributed private computation [1],
as captured by our functionalities. Informally, assuming s to be a secret key, the aim of the protocol is to
compute a value cs given an element c of the group. This computation can be used to perform distributed
BLS signatures [10], ElGamal decryptions [19], linear decryptions [8], and BF or BB1 identity-based key
extraction [9,7].
Here we focus on ElGamal decryptions, relying on the DDH assumption. We emphasize that the
protocol as given relies exclusively on DDH, not requiring any additional assumption; and that it can be
easily modi￿ed to rely on the Decision Linear assumption for compatibility with bilinear groups [8].
Building Blocks. Let G be a group of prime order p, and g a generator of this group. We furthermore
assume to be given an element h in G as a CRS. We use the following building blocks:
Password Selection. Each user Pi owns a privately selected password pwi, to act as the i-th share
of the secret key sk (see below). For convenience, we write pwi = pwi;1 :::pwi;` 2 f0;:::;2L`   1g, i.e.,
we further divide each password pwi into ` blocks pwi;j 2 f0;:::;2L   1g of L bits each, where p < 2`L.
The segmentation into blocks is a technicality to get e￿cient extractable commitments for long passwords:
in the concrete scheme, for example, we shall use single-bit blocks in order to achieve the most e￿cient
extraction (i.e, L = 1 and ` = 160 for a 160-bit prime p). Notice that although we allow full-size passwords
of up to L` bits (the size of p), users are of course permitted to choose shorter passwords.
Password Combination. The private key sk is de￿ned as the (virtual) combination of all the passwords
pwi. It does not matter how precisely such combination is done, as long as it is reproducible and preserves
the joint entropy of the set of passwords (up to log2 p bits, since that is the length of sk). For example, if
there are n users, all with short passwords pw




i pwi will ensure that there are no ￿aliasing e￿ects￿, or mutual cancellation of two or more
passwords.
In general, it is preferable that each user independently transforms his or her true password pw
i into
an e￿ective password pwi by applying a suitable extractor pwi = H(i;pw
i;Zi) where Zi is any relevant
public information such as a description of the group and its purpose. We can then safely take sk =
P
i pwi
and be assured that the entropy of sk will closely match the joint entropy of the vector (pw
1;:::;pw
n)
taken together. Such password pre-processing using hashing is very standard but falls outside of the
functionalities proper.
Public and Private Keys. We use the (e￿ective) passwords pwi to de￿ne a key pair (sk;pk = gsk)

















10The ElGamal KEM public-key operation is the encapsulation Enc : (pk;r) 7! (c = gr;m = pk
r),
which outputs a random session key m and a ciphertext c. The private-key operation is the decapsulation
Dec : (sk;c) 7! m = csk, which here is deterministic. Observe that whereas Dec instantiates PrivateComp in
the functionalities, Enc is intended for public third-party usage and never appears in the private protocols.
Entropy Preservation. In order for the low password entropies to combine nicely in the secret
key sk =
P
i pwi, the e￿ective pwi must be properly ￿decoupled￿ to avoid mutual cancellations, as just
discussed.
We note that, even with the kind of shu￿ing previously considered, it is quite possible that the actual
entropy of sk will be smaller than its maximum value of log2 p bits, e.g., if there are not enough non-
corrupted users or if their passwords are too small. Nevertheless, there is no known e￿ective attack against
discrete logarithm and related problems that can take advantage of any reduced entropy of sk, barring
an exhaustive search over the space of possible values. Speci￿cally, regardless of how the passwords are
actually combined, one could easily prove that no generic attack [30] can solve the discrete logarithm or the
DDH problem in less than
p
2h operations, where h is the min-entropy of the private key sk conditionally
on all known passwords.
Computational Assumption. Our concrete protocols rely on the Decisional Di￿e-Hellman (DDH)
assumption, stated here for completeness: Let G = hgi be a multiplicative abelian cyclic group of prime
order p. For random x;y;z 2 Z
p, it is computationally intractable to distinguish (g;gx;gy;gxy) from
(g;gx;gy;gz).
Extractable Homomorphic Commitments. The ￿rst step of our distributed decryption protocol
is for each user to commit to his password (the details are given in the following section). The commit-
ment needs to be extractable, homomorphic, and compatible with the shape of the public key. Generally
speaking, one needs a commitment Commit(pw;r) that is additively homomorphic on pw and with certain
properties on r. In order to simplify the following description of the protocols, we chose to use ElGamal’s
scheme [19], which is additive on the random value r, and given by: Commitv(pw;r) = (vpwhr;gr). The
semantic security relies on the above DDH assumption. Extractability is possible granted the decryption
key x, such that h = gx in the common reference string.
Simulation-Sound Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Informally speaking, a zero-
knowledge proof system is said to be simulation-sound if it has the property that an adversary cannot give
a convincing proof for a false statement, even if it has oracle access to the zero-knowledge simulator. We
also require non-malleability, which is to say that a proof of some theorem cannot be turned into a proof
of another theorem. De Santis et al. proved in [17] the existence of such a scheme, with the additional
property of being non-interactive, if we assume the existence of one-way trapdoor permutations. Note
that their scheme allows for multiple simulations with a unique common random string (CRS), which is
crucial for the multi-session case. If we instantiate all the SSNIZK proofs with those, then our protocols
are UC-secure in the CRS model.
However, for sake of e￿ciency, we can instead instantiate them using Schnorr-like proofs of equality of
discrete logarithms [21], which rely on the random-oracle model [4], but are signi￿cantly more practical.
These SSNIZK are well-known (see details in Appendix C and their proofs in [21]), but along these lines, we
use the notation SSNIZK(L(w)) for a proof that w lies in the language L. More precisely, CDH(g;G;h;H)
will state that (g;G;h;H) lies in the CDH language: there exists a common exponent x such that G = gx
and H = hx.
Intuition. We ￿rst describe the distributed decryption algorithm. All the users are provided with a
password pwi, a public key pk, and a ciphertext c. One of them is the leader of the group, denoted by P1,
and the others are P2;:::;Pn. For this given ciphertext c 2 G, the leader wants to obtain m = csk. But
before computing this value, everybody wants to be sure that all the users are honest, or at least that the
combination of the passwords is compatible with the public key.
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Fig.4. Individual steps of the distributed key generation protocol
The protocol starts by verifying that they will be able to decrypt the ciphertext, and thus that they
indeed know a representation of the decryption key into shares. Each user sends a commitment Ci of his
password. As we see in the proof (see Appendix B), this commitment needs to be extractable so that the
simulator is able to recover the passwords used by the adversary: this is a requirement of the UC model,
as in [14]. Indeed, the simulator needs to be able to simulate everything without knowing any passwords,
he thus recovers the passwords by extracting them from the commitments Ci made by the adversary in
this ￿rst round, enabling him to adjust his own values before the subsequent commitments, so that all the
passwords are compatible with the public key (if they should be in the situation at hand). If we think in
terms of ElGamal encryption, the extraction is proportional in the square root of the size of the alphabet,
which would be practical for 20-bit passwords but not 160-bit ones (and even if passwords are usually
small, we do not want to restrict the size of the passwords). This is the reason why we segmented all the
passwords into small blocks: to commit to them block by block. In our concrete description, blocks are of
size 1, which will help to make the proof of validity: ElGamal encryption of one bit.
Once this ￿rst step is done, the users commit again to their passwords. The new commitments C0
i
will be the ones used in the rest of the protocol. They need not be segmented (since we will not extract
anything from them), but we ask the users to prove that they are compatible with the former ones. Note
that they use the three values H = H(C1;:::;Cn) (where H is a collision-resistant hash function), pk,
and c, as ￿labels￿ of these commitments (see below), to avoid malleability and replay from the previous
sessions, granted the SSNIZK proofs that include and thus check these labels.
Next, the users make yet another commitment Ai to their passwords, but this time they do an ElGamal
encryption of pwi in base c instead of in base g (in the above C0
i commitment). That is, each user computes
Ai = (cpwihti;gti). The commitment C0
i will be used to check the possibility of the decryption (that it is
12consistent with pk = gsk), whereas Ai will be used to actually compute the decryption csk, hence the two
di￿erent bases g and c in C0
i and Ai, respectively.
All the users send these last two commitments to everybody, along with a SSNIZK proof that the
same password was used each time. These proofs are ￿labeled￿ by H, pk, and c, and the veri￿cation by
the other users will succeed only if their ￿labels￿ are identical. This enables all the players to check that
everybody shares the same public key pk and the same ciphertext c. It thus avoids situations in which a
group leader with an incorrect key obtains a correct decryption message, contrary to the ideal functionality.
The protocol will thus fail if H, pk, or c is not the same to everyone, which is the result required by the
ideal functionality. Note that the protocol will also fail if the adversary drops or modi￿es a ￿ow received
by a user, even if everything was correct (compatible passwords, same public key, same ciphertext). This
situation is modeled in the functionality by the bit b of the key/decryption delivery queries, for when
everything goes well but the group leader does not obtain the result.
After these rounds of commitments, a veri￿cation step allows for the group leader, but also all the
players, to check whether the public key and the passwords are compatible. Note that at this point,
everything has become publicly veri￿able so that the group leader will not be able to cheat and make the















distributed random exponent  =
P
i i. The ratio of the blinded values is taken to cancel the h
P
i si,
leaving gsk. A ￿nal ￿unblinding ring￿ is applied to remove the exponent  and expose gsk. This ends with a
decision by the group leader on whether to abort the protocol (when the passwords are incompatible with
the public key) or go on to the computation step. We stress that every user is able to check the validity
of the group leader’s decision: A dishonest execution cannot continue without an honest user becoming
aware of it (and aborting it). Note however that an honest execution can also be stopped by a user if the
adversary modi￿es a ￿ow destined to it, as re￿ected by the bit b in the ideal functionality.
If the group leader decides to go on, the players assist in the computation of csk, again with the help
of two blinding and one unblinding rings, starting from the commitments Ai. Note that if at some point a
user fails to send its value to everyone (for instance due to a denial of service attack) or if the adversary
modi￿es a ￿ow (in a man-in-the-middle attack), the protocol will fail. In the ideal world this means that
the simulator makes a decryption delivery with a bit b set to zero. Because of the SSNIZK proofs, in these
decryption rounds exactly the same sequence of passwords as in the ￿rst rounds has to be used by the
players. This necessarily implies compatibility with the public key, but may be a stronger condition.
As a side note, observe that all the blinding rings in the veri￿cation and the computation steps could
be made concurrent instead of sequential, in order to simplify the protocol. Notice however that the ￿nal
unblinding ring of csk in the computation step should only be carried out after the public key and the
committed passwords are known to be compatible, and the passwords to be the same in both sequences
of commitments, i.e. after the veri￿cation step succeeded.
We show in Appendix B that we can e￿ciently simulate these computations without the knowledge of
the pwi’s, so that they do not reveal anything more about the pwi’s than pk already does. More precisely,
we show that such computations are indistinguishable to A under the DDH assumption.
The key generation protocol (computation of pk = gsk) is a special case of the decryption protocol
outlined above (computation of gsk, test that gsk = pk, computation of m = csk), only simpler. Indeed,
we only need one set of commitments for the last rounds of blinding/unblinding, as we omit all the prior
veri￿cations (since there is nothing to verify when the key is ￿rst set up).
We now describe more precisely both protocols (see Figures 4 and 5).
Details of the Distributed Key Generation ￿ realizing FpwDistPublicKeyGen (Figure 4).
 First Step of Commitment (1a). Each user Pi commits to its share pwi (divided into ` blocks
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Fig.5. Individual steps of the distributed decryption protocol
= (gpwi;jhri;j;gri;j), for j = 1;:::;`, and ￿publishes￿ (i.e., tries to send to everybody) Ci = (Ci;1;:::;Ci;`),
with SSNIZK proofs that each commitment indeed commits to an L-bit block.
 Second Step of Commitment (1b). Each user Pi computes H = H(C1;:::;Cn), and commits again








(gpwihsi;gsi;H), an publishes it along with a SSNIZK proof that the passwords committed are the same
































Notice that this de￿nition of L implies equality of passwords between the commitments; the passwords




(1). See Figure 4, Step (1b) for the realization of these SSNIZK proofs.
 First Step of Computation (1c). If one of the proofs received by a user is incorrect, it aborts
the game. Otherwise, they share the same H and C0









0 ) by multiplying the ￿rst parts of the commitments C0
i to each other.
14The group leader P1 wants to compute g
P
pwi = pk. For i = 1;:::;n, sequentially, Pi chooses a random






i ). It then produces a SSNIZK proof that it used the same








i 1 respectively, and publishes i along with
such proof, whose language is the following equality of discrete logarithms ￿ see Figure 4, Step (1c)
L1 =
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If the proof is not valid, the next user aborts. If all goes well, at the end the users will have performed a
￿round of blinding￿ where each user Pi contributed its own random ephemeral exponent i.
 Second Step of Computation (1d). Denote
Q
i by . When the users receive the last ele-




si;h), they all compute and publish the value hi = hsi, along with a SSNIZK
proof that their random value si is the same as the one they used in C0
i (as before, the language of this




i;hi) j 9si such that C0
i
(2) = gsi and hi = (h)
si
o
 Third Step of Computation (1e). At this point, each user is able ￿rst to compute h
P
si by
multiplying all the hi together, and then, by division of 
(1)
n by that value, obtain g
P
pwi = n+1. Then,
for i = n;:::;2, sequentially, user Pi computes i = (i+1)1=i, along with a SSNIZK proof that the i


















i and i = (i+1)1=i	
Each player thus sequentially publishes i and the proof, allowing the remaining users to proceed. This
backward ￿round of unblinding￿ removes the blinding  in the reverse order it was applied.
 Last Step of Computation (1f). The last player to take part in the unblinding is the group
leader P1, who is thus the ￿rst to obtain the ￿nal unblinded public key 1 = (2)1=1 = g
P
pwi = pk.
To communicate the key to the others, the group leader publishes 1 and the related SSNIZK proof.
All the users can then perform the ￿nal unblinding step for themselves and be certain that the resulting
key corresponds to the initial password commitments.
Details of the Distributed Decryption ￿ realizing FpwDistPrivateComp (Figure 5).
 Common Verification of the Public Key (2a)   (2f). These steps are almost the same as
in the former protocol, except for (2b) that di￿ers from (1b) for the label that not only contains H, but












This extended label will make sure that all the players use the same data. We also anticipate the goal





i ) = (cpwihti;gti), together with a SSNIZK proof that the same password pwi is committed in
both C0
i and Ai, with di￿erent bases, g and c respectively.
This proof is a bit more intricate, but it consists of several proofs of equalities of discrete logarithms:
we ￿rst compute and publish the following elements, for a random ui




(1))ui = guipwihuisi = gihi bi = (C0
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(2))ui = guisi = gi Gi = gi
ci = (A
(1)
i )ui = cuipwihuiti = cihi di = (A
(2)
i )ui = guiti = gi  i = ci
and also publish SSNIZK proofs that:






















￿ the same i is used to compute Gi and  i, from g and c respectively: CDH(g;Gi;c; i)
15￿ this i is indeed committed in base g in (ai;bi): CDH(g;bi;h;ai=Gi)
￿ this i is indeed committed in base c in (ci;di): CDH(g;di;h;ci= i)
If one of the proofs received by a user is incorrect, this user aborts the game. Otherwise, since they
share the values H and C0






si;h) by multiplying the ￿rst
parts of the commitments C0
i to each other.
The group leader P1 wants to check whether g
P
pwi = pk. This is done by two blinding and unblinding
rings and their associated SSNIZK proofs, exactly as in the computation step of the former protocol: at
the end, the group leader does publish 1 = g
P
pwi (along with the corresponding proof) and every player
is able to check whether the result is correct or not.
 Leader Computation using the Virtual Private Key (3a) (3d). We now start the compu-
tation of csk in the same manner as gsk, doing two blinding and unblinding rings (using random ti instead
of si and random values i di￿erent from i) and their supporting sequences of SSNIZK. This time, the
users use the commitments in base c, namely the Ai, and so in the end the group leader obtains c
P
pwi but
does not publish it. Since the group leader starts the computation and does not publish the ￿nal result
c
P
pwi, it is the only one to learn the message obtained (and even the only one aware that the decryption
succeeded, although that information might be di￿cult to conceal in a real-world application).
Note that in the real-world protocol, a player is compromised if the adversary A guessed a compatible
password in the ￿rst ￿ow. Because of the SSNIZK proofs, in this case the adversary is the only one able
to send the next ￿ows in an acceptable way.
The proofs of these theorems can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 Let b FpwDistPublicKeyGen be the concurrent multi-session extension of FpwDistPublicKeyGen. The
distributed key generation protocol in Figure 4 securely realizes b FpwDistPublicKeyGen for ElGamal key gener-
ation, in the CRS model, in the presence of static adversaries, provided that DDH is infeasible in G, H is
collision-resistant, and SSNIZK proofs for the CDH language exist.
Theorem 2 Let b FpwDistPrivateComp be the concurrent multi-session extension of FpwDistPrivateComp. The dis-
tributed decryption protocol in Figure 5 securely realizes b FpwDistPrivateComp for ElGamal decryption, in the
CRS model, in the presence of static adversaries, provided that DDH is infeasible in G, H is collision-
resistant, and SSNIZK proofs for the CDH language exist.
As stated above, our protocol is only proven secure against static adversaries. Unlike adaptive ones,
static adversaries are only allowed to corrupt protocol participants prior to the beginning of the protocol
execution.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, we have brought together ideas from secret sharing, threshold cryptography, password-
based protocols, and multi-party computation, to devise a practical approach to (distributed) password-
based public-key cryptography. For a given cryptosystem, the objective was to de￿ne, from a set of user-
selected weak passwords held in di￿erent locations, a virtual private key that is as strong and resistant to
attacks as any regular key, and that can be used in a distributed manner without ever requiring its actual
reconstitution.
We proposed general de￿nitions of such functionalities in the UC model, carefully justifying all our
design choices along the way. In particular, we saw that it is mandatory to require the presence of a ￿group
leader￿ who directs the private computation process and solely obtains its end result. We then constructed
explicit protocols for the simple but instructive case of ElGamal encryption. Speci￿cally, relying on the
16DDH assumption, we constructed and proved the security of two ElGamal key generation and decryption
protocols, whose private key is virtual and implied by a distributed collection of arbitrary passwords.
To conclude, we now argue that the approach outlined in this paper is in fact quite general and has
broad applications. It can of course be viewed as a restriction of the Unauthenticated MPC framework
of [1]; but this would be missing the point, since as often in the UC model, much (or most) of the work
has been done once the functionality de￿nitions have been laid down. The functionalities that we have
carefully crafted here should apply essentially without change to most kinds of public-key primitives.
The protocols also generalize easily beyond ElGamal decryption. The same method that let us compute
csk from a distributed sk = hpw1;:::;pwni, can also compute pairs of vectors (csk
i ;cr
j) for a random
ephemeral r contributed by all the players ￿ or, precisely, for r =
P
i ri where each ri is initially committed
to by each player, in a similar way as they initially commit to their passwords. By the hiding and binding
properties of the commitments this guarantees that r is uniform and unpredictable if at least one player
draws ri at random.
Remarkably, this is enough to let us do ￿password-based distributed IBE￿, where the private-key gen-
erator is decentralized over a set of users, each of them holding only a short private password of their own
choosing. PrivateComp is now a key extraction function that maps user identities id to user decryption
keys did. To get: ￿Password-based￿ Boneh-Franklin (BF) IBE [9], we need to compute did = H(id)sk
where H(id) is a public hash of a user’s identity. This is analogous to csk, and thus our protocol works
virtually unchanged. To get: ￿Password-based￿ Boneh-Boyen (BB 1) IBE [7], here did is randomized
and of the form (gsk
0 (gid
1 g2)r;gr
3). This ￿ts the general form of what we can compute by adding ephemerals
to our protocol as just discussed.
Note that in some bilinear groups the DDH problem is easy: in those groups, we must replace DDH-
based commitments with ones based on a weaker assumption, such as D-Linear [8]; such changes are
straightforward.
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A The UC Framework
The aim of the UC security model is to ensure that UC-secure protocols will continue to behave in the
ideal way even if executed in arbitrary environments. This model relies on the indistinguishability between
two worlds, the ideal world and the real world. In the ideal world, the security is provided by an ideal
functionality F.
One can think of it as a trusted party in the context of multi-party computation: this functionality
interacts with n users having to compute a function f. These users give their inputs to F, which gives
them back their outputs. We stress that there is no communication between the users. F ensures that the
computation is correct and that the users learn nothing more than their own inputs and outputs. Security
is then guaranteed since an adversary A can only learn and thus modify the data of corrupted users.
18In order to prove that a protocol  veri￿es F, one considers an environment Z that provides inputs to
the users and acts as a distinguisher between the real world (with actual users and a real adversary that
can control some of them and also the communication among them) and the ideal world (with dummy
users interacting only with the ideal functionality F, and a simulated adversary also interacting with F).
We then say that the protocol  realizes F if for all polynomial adversary A, there exists a polynomial
simulator S such that no polynomial environment Z can distinguish between the two worlds (one with F
and S, the other with  and A) with a signi￿cant advantage.
Since there are several copies of a functionality F running in parallel, each one has a unique session
identi￿er sid. All the messages must contain the SID of the copy they are intended for. As in [14], we
assume for simplicity that each protocol realizing F has inputs containing its SID. We also assume that
each user starts a session by specifying the SID of F, its identity Pi, its password pwi, and the identities
of the other users Pid.
A shortcoming of the UC theorem is that is says nothing about protocols sharing state and randomness
(it ensures the security of a single unit only). Here, since we need a common reference string for all instances
of the protocol, we need a stronger result, provided by Canetti and Rabin in [15] and called universal
composability with joint state. Informally, they de￿ne the multi-session extension b F of F, which basically
runs multiple instances of F, where each of them is identi￿ed by a sub-session identi￿er ssid. b F has to be
executed with sid and ssid. When it receives a message m containing ssid, it hands m to the copy of F
having the SSID ssid (or invokes a new one if such copy does not exist).
For the sake of generality, we shall describe all the functionalities in the context of adaptive adversaries,
that are allowed to corrupt users whenever they like to. For simplicity, however, we shall only prove the
security of our constructions in presence of static adversaries, that have to choose which users to corrupt
before the beginning of the execution of the protocol, either implicitly in the key generation protocol (when
the adversary starts playing as one of the parties, choosing by himself the password), or explicitly in the
decryption protocol (asking a corruption before a new decryption session).
In the UC model, a corruption implies a complete access to the internal memory of the users (which
here means the password and the internal state); in addition, the adversary takes the entire control of the
corrupted user, and can modify its behavior for the remaining of the protocol.
B Proof of the Security Theorems
In this section we give a sketch of the proof that the protocols described on Figures 4 and 5 respectively
realize the functionalities speci￿ed on Figures 2 and 3.
The proof of the distributed key generation protocol is similar to that of the distributed decryption
given below, with the added simpli￿cation that there is no veri￿cation step and the di￿erence that all the
users receive the result in the end (which corresponds exactly to what happens in the decryption protocol
at the end of the veri￿cation step, where everyone also receives the result). Thus, we refer to the proof
of the second protocol for the workings of the simulation. The additional simpli￿cation implied by the
adversary receiving the result in the end will be given in remarks.
B.1 Sketch of the Proof.
The objective of the proof is to construct, from a real-world adversary A, an ideal-world simulator S, so
that the behavior of A in the real world and that of S in the ideal world are indistinguishable to the
environment. The ideal functionalities are speci￿ed in Figures 2 and 3 and described in Section 2. Since
we use the joint state version of the UC theorem, we implicitly consider the multi-session extension of
this functionality, and thus replace all sid by (sid;ssid). Note that the passwords of the users depend
19on the sub-session considered. For sake of simplicity, we denote them by pwi, but one should implicitly
understand pwi;ssid.
In the real game, we know that the protocol cannot continue past the two initial commitment rounds if
there is any inconsistency (between the passwords pwi used in all the commitments, and between the copies
of pk and c held by all the users). Any inconsistency will violate the SSNIZK language L, and because
the proof system with honest setup is assumed to be sound, it is not feasible for anyone to prove a false
statement. Similarly, the two rounds of blinding and unblinding serve to verify the consistency of pk with
the pwi’s, and to compute the ￿nal output csk, respectively. To be precise, the security of these rounds
follows from our assumptions: cheating in the computation of the blinding/unblinding rounds without
getting caught requires a SSNIZK proof forgery; while distinguishing the ￿nal decryption csk from random
by anyone other than the group leader is reducible to solving the DDH problem in G.
B.2 Description of the simulator.
This description is based on that of [14]. When initialized with security parameter k, the simulator ￿rst
chooses a random element h = gx 2 G, and uses the zero-knowledge simulator to obtain its CRS . He
￿nally initializes the real-world adversary A, giving him (h;) as common reference string.
From this moment on, S interacts with the environment Z, the functionality FpwDistPrivateComp and his
subroutine A. For the most part, this interaction is implemented by S just choosing a dummy password
and following the protocol on behalf of all the honest players. In addition, instead of following the honest
prover strategy, S uses the zero-knowledge simulator in all the proofs (which is indistinguishable due to
the zero-knowledge property of the proof protocol). If a session aborts or terminates, then S reports it
to A.
Recall that we use the model of split functionalities described in [1] and that the users are partitioned
in disjoint sessions according to what they received in the ￿rst ￿ow. This means that, in the following,
we can assume that all the players have received the same values of Ci;j. This is particularly useful when
A controls a set of users since these commitments are extractable. Indeed, note that choosing g and h
allows S to know the discrete logarithm x of h in base g. Since the commitments are ElGamal ciphertexts,
knowledge of logg h will allow the simulator to decrypt the ciphertexts and then extract the passwords
used by A in the ￿rst-round commitments. (The actual extraction requires taking discrete logarithms,
but this can be done e￿ciently using generic methods, because the discrete logarithms to extract are the
L-bit password sub-blocks which by design have a very small domain. And the small size is enforced by a













More details on the simulations of the di￿erent ￿ows follow. Note that if anything goes wrong or S
receives a message formatted di￿erently from what is expected by the session, then S aborts that session
and noti￿es A.
Session Initialization. When receiving a message (ssid;Pid;Pi;pk;c;role) from FpwDistPrivateComp, the
simulator S starts simulating a new session of the protocol for party Pi, group Pid, session identi￿er ssid,
and common reference string (h = gx;). We denote this session by (Pi;ssid).
Step (1a). S chooses at random nh dummy passwords on behalf of each of the nh honest players,
computes the ￿rst-round commitments, and sends them along with the corresponding (and simulated)
proofs. Since the ￿rst-round commitment is computationally hiding under the DDH assumption, this is
20indistinguishable from a real execution. S then learns from the functionality whether the users all share
the same c and pk or not. In the second case, S aborts the game.
Step (1b). If all users are honest, S asks a Private Computation query along with a Leader Decryption
Delivery query to the functionality, which returns either complete or error. If it returns complete, then
S keeps on using the nh   1 last dummy passwords, but sets the value gpw1 of the group leader P1
such that it is compatible with the value pk = gsk (without knowing the corresponding password): The
computation will be correct. S then sends the second-round commitments, along with the corresponding
(and simulated) proofs. Note that the password used for the group leader will not be compatible with csk
but this does not matter since it will never be disclosed and will not make the protocol fail. Also note
that, since C1 and C0
1 will not be compatible, S will have to prove a false statement for P1, which is
indistinguishable from a real execution since the proofs are simulated.
Remark. Note that for the distributed key generation protocol, things would have been simpler. In
this case, the simulator not only receives complete or error, but the exact value of pk = gsk. He is thus able
to modify gpw1 such that the passwords are compatible with the public key. Same thing will apply below.
If the query returns error, then the simulator keeps on using the dummy passwords (there is no need
that they should be compatible) and sends the new commitments along with the corresponding (simulated)
proofs.
If some users are corrupted, S extracts the passwords and asks a testPwd query. If it is correct, S keeps
the nh   1 ￿rst dummy passwords and changes the last value g
pwinh to be compatible with Equation (1)
(without knowing the corresponding password). In the same round, S must also produce another series of
password commitments, this time as ElGamal encryptions of cpwi and not gpwi. We now have to consider
two cases. First, if the group leader is attacked, S computes the commitments normally for the ￿rst nh 1
honest players using the simulated passwords. For the last player Pinh, he asks a Private Computation
query along with a Leader Computation Delivery query in order to recover csk, and computes the missing
commitment as an ElGamal encryption of c
pw0













Otherwise, if the group leader is not attacked, the simulator will not recover csk. We thus proceed as
in the honest case, using an incorrect value cpw1 for the group leader.
Finally, if the testPwd query returns incorrect, since the veri￿cation step will fail, S can keep all the
dummy passwords (in base g as in base c), and send these commitments along with the corresponding
(simulated) proofs.
The indistinguishability between the simulation of this step and the real execution relies on the non-
malleability and the computationally hiding property of the commitment (relying in the DDH assumption).
The adversary cannot become aware that the passwords are not the good ones, or that the password for
the user P1 or Pinh changed between the two rounds of commitments.
Following Steps. At this stage, everything is set. If the users are honest and share compatible passwords,
then S continues honestly the protocol, by choosing random values i and i and executing the four rings
as described in the protocol. Recall that the very last step will fail, without any consequence on the
￿nal result, and only in the view of the group leader. S ￿nally asks a Leader Computation Delivery query,
setting the bit b to 1 if the execution succeeded and to 0 otherwise (for instance if some ￿ows were non
oracle-generated).
If there are some corrupted players, sharing compatible passwords with the rest of the group, S also
continues the game honestly with the four rings. Everything goes well if the group leader is attacked.
21Otherwise, the last step fails, without any bad consequence since the group leader ends the ring (as
before). The bit b is chosen as described above: If something goes wrong and the protocol halts, then
b = 0, otherwise b = 1.
If the players do not share compatible passwords, then the simulator continues honestly the protocol
(without knowing the real passwords of the users) until it fails, at the veri￿cation step. The simulator then
asks a Private Computation query, along with a Leader Computation Delivery query, setting the bit b to 0.
Finally, this simulation is indistinguishable from the ideal world, since the group leader receives a
correct message in this simulation if and only if it receives a correct message in the ideal world.
Remark. Incidentally, what makes the proofs easier in our new paradigm than in key exchange protocols,
is that at the end it is not needed to make sure that all the participants obtain the same key in the real
world if and only if they do in the ideal world. In our setting, we only need to worry about the key received
by a single party: the group leader.
This establishes that, given any adversary A that attacks the protocol  in the real world, we can
build a simulator S that interacts with the functionality F in the ideal world, in such a way that the
environment cannot distinguish which world it is in.
B.3 Details of the Proof.
In this proof, we incrementally de￿ne a sequence of games starting from the one describing a real execution
of the protocol and ending up with game G7 which we prove to be indistinguishable with respect to the
ideal experiment.
The objective of the proof is to construct from an adversary A a simulator S in the ideal world, so
that the behavior of A in the real world and that of S in the ideal world are indistinguishable to the
environment. S is incrementally de￿ned in the games, ending up to be completely de￿ned in G7 (though
we do not rewrite him entirely in this game since his behavior was described in the previous games). This
￿nal game will then be proven to be indistinguishable to the ideal world, showing that we indeed have
constructed an ideal simulator to the real-world adversary A.
In the ￿rst games, the simulator has actually access to all the information given to the users by the
environment, in particular their passwords. In the last game, we nearly are in the ideal game so that
the users do not exist anymore: S only has access to the information transmitted by his queries to the
functionality (not to the passwords, for instance) and he has to simulate the users entirely by himself.
Between these two situations, the simulator lives in a world which is not really real, not really ideal.
In order to formally model this situation, we chose to consider three hybrid queries that S can ask
to the functionality all along the games. The CompatiblePwd query checks whether the passwords of the
users are compatible with the passwords of the other users and the public key of the group leader. The
Computation query gives back the message obtained by decrypting the ciphertext. And the Delivery query
gives the result to the group leader￿and to the adversary if the former is compromised.
Note that since in the ￿rst games, the simulator has access to the users’ inputs, he knows their
passwords. In such a case a CompatiblePwd query (or a Computation or Delivery query) can be easily
implemented by letting the simulator look at the passwords owned by the users. When the users are
entirely simulated, without the knowledge of their passwords, S will replace the queries above with the
real testPwd, Decryption Computation and Leader Decryption Delivery queries to the functionality.
We say that a ￿ow is oracle-generated if it was sent by an honest user and arrives without any alteration
to the user it was meant to. We say it is non-oracle-generated otherwise, that is either if it was sent by an
honest user and modi￿ed by the adversary, or if it was sent by a corrupted user or a user impersonated by
the adversary (more generally denoted by attacked user, that is, a user whose password is known to the
adversary).
22Game G0: Real game.
In this game, we know that the protocol cannot continue past the two initial commitment rounds if
there is any inconsistency (between the passwords pwi used in all the commitments, and between the copies
of pk and c held by all the users). Any inconsistency will violate the SSNIZK language L, and because
the proof system with honest setup is assumed to be sound, it is not feasible for anyone to prove a false
statement.
Similarly, the two rounds of blinding and unblinding serve to verify the consistency of pk with the
pwi’s, and to compute the ￿nal decryption csk of c, respectively. To be precise, the security of these rounds
follows from our assumptions: cheating in the computation of the blinding/unblinding rounds without
getting caught requires a SSNIZK proof forgery; while distinguishing the ￿nal decryption csk from random
by anyone other than the group leader is reducible to solving the DDH problem in G.
Game G1: Simulation of the SSNIZK proofs.
From this game on, we allow the simulator to program (once and for all) the common reference string
(h = gx;), where  is a common reference string for the SSNIZK proofs, and h for the commitment (and
x the extraction key).
Additionally, this game modi￿es how the zero-knowledge proofs are performed. Speci￿cally, instead of
using the honest-prover strategy, all the proofs in which the prover is an honest user are simulated using
the zero-knowledge simulator. (Note that the common reference string  is also simulated once for all.)
Since the proofs are concurrent zero-knowledge, the environment cannot distinguish between the two
games G1 and G0. That is, if an environment could distinguish between these hybrids, one could construct
an adversary that breaks the zero-knowledge property of the proof protocol.
Game G2: Simulation of the ￿rst round of commitments.
From this game on, S simulates the ￿rst rounds of commitments in the following way. We suppose
that he still knows the passwords of the players. Let ` be the number of honest users, i.e. the users S has
to simulate. S chooses at random ` dummy passwords f pwi1;:::; f pwi` on behalf of each one of these users.
Once all these values are set, S computes the ￿rst-round commitments and send them to everybody.
S then learns from the functionality whether the users all share the same c and pk or not. In the second
case, S aborts the game. In the ￿rst case, S goes on the execution of the protocol in a honest way, using
the real passwords of the users. Note that he will have to prove false statements, which is not a problem
since the proofs are simulated since the former game. In the end, if the execution succeeds, he asks a
Computation query, and he ￿nally sets the bit b to 1 in the Delivery query. Otherwise, if the execution fails,
he also asks a Computation query but sets the bit b to 0 for the delivery.
Since the ￿rst-round commitment is hiding, the adversary cannot become aware of the transformation
of pwi` into f pwi`: this game is indistinguishable from G1.
Game G3: Simulation of honest users with compatible passwords.
From this game on, we show how to simulate the users without using their passwords. More precisely,
the simulator is still supposed to know the passwords of the users, but little by little we are going to show
that he actually never needs them in the simulation. This will ensure in the end that the simulator does
not need the knowledge of the passwords in order to perform the simulation honestly.
Note that from this game on, we can suppose that all the c and the pk are identical, since the case
of di￿erent values has been dealt with in the former game (and the simulator aborts the protocol in this
case). The ￿rst round of commitments is simulated as in G2. We now face two cases.
First, if there are attacked users among the group, the simulation continues as in the former game,
S being allowed to use the passwords of all the users. (We show in G5 and G6 how to simulate in this
case without using the passwords.)
Second, if all users are honest, we show how to continue the simulation without the help of the
passwords. Note that if at some point some ￿ows are non-oracle-generated, the protocol will abort: In this
23case, the simulator will set the bit b to 0 in the Delivery query. This comes from the non-malleability of the
SSNIZK proofs. If the adversary has not generated the ￿rst commitments, he will not be able to construct
valid proofs, with unknown witnesses.
The simulator ￿rst asks a Computation query along with a Delivery query to the functionality, which
gives him either complete or error. In the second case, S continues the simulation as in the former game,
and we allow him to use the passwords of the users (we show in G4 how to get rid of the use of the
passwords in this case).
We now consider the ￿rst case and sum up brie￿y the circumstances which led us here: The users are
honest, they have the same c and pk, and their passwords are compatible with the public key. Then, S keeps





1) such that all the passwords are compatible with the value gsk, using the equation: g
P
f pwi = gsk. But
he still uses cf pw1 for the last commitment, since he does not know csk. Notice that he will give once again
a proof for a false statement. The simulator then continues honestly the game, by choosing random values
i and i and executing the four rings as described in the protocol. Only the very last step will fail, since
the last value cf pw1 is incompatible with the other ones. But this does not matter because this value is
never sent or used in the remaining of the protocol. In the Delivery query, the bit b is chosen as described
in G2. Finally note that the simulator never needed the knowledge of the passwords of the users.
Due to the non-malleability of the commitments, along with their hiding property, this game is indis-
tinguishable from G2.
Remark. Note that for the distributed key generation protocol, things would have been simpler. In
this case, the simulator not only receives complete or error, but the exact value of pk = gsk. He is thus able
to modify f pw1 such that the passwords are compatible with the public key. Same thing will apply to G5.
Game G4: Simulation of honest users with incompatible passwords.
This game starts exactly as in G3. If there are attacked users, the simulator is granted the right to use
the passwords of all the users, and continues as in G2.
If all the users are honest, he continues as in G3, by asking a Computation query. We showed in G3 how
to deal with the case where the functionality returns correct (that is, when the passwords are compatible
with the public key) without using the passwords of the users. We now consider the other case and show
how to treat it. Thus, we suppose that the Computation query returns an error, meaning that the passwords
are incompatible with the public key.
The simulator then computes commitments of the values gf pwi and cf pwi for all the users (there is no
need that their passwords should be compatible). He sends them along with the corresponding proofs to
the other users. The simulator then continues honestly the game, by choosing random values i and i
and executing the two ￿rst rings as described in the protocol. Note that the real passwords of the users
are not needed anymore. Since the protocol will fail at the veri￿cation step, the simulator will set the bit
b to 0 in the Delivery query.
Since the commitments are hiding, this game is indistinguishable from G3.
Game G5: Simulation in case of compatible passwords in presence of an adversary.
This game starts exactly as in G2. The case where all the users are honest has been dealt with in
the games G3 and G4. We now consider the case in which the adversary controls a set of users. He can
either know their passwords (corrupted users) or not (compromised users). Recall that we denote by ` the
number of honest users.
Note that choosing g and h allows S to know the discrete logarithm of h in base g. Since the commit-
ments are ElGamal ciphertexts, knowledge of logg h will allow the simulator to decrypt the ciphertexts
and then extract the passwords used by A in the ￿rst-round commitments. (The actual extraction requires
taking discrete logarithms, but this can be done e￿ciently using generic methods, because the discrete
24logarithms to extract are the L-bit password sub-blocks which by design have a very small domain. And
the small size is enforced by a SSNIZK.)
After this ￿rst round, the simulator thus extracts the passwords used by the adversary in the com-
mitments he sent. Note that the honest users are not supposed to have received the same values from
the adversary: We only know that these values are non-oracle-generated, but not necessarily equal. Thus,
the simulator chooses at random one of the commitments received from an attacked user to extract and
recover its password. One could argue that there is a problem here, but note that the proof given with
the second commitment will fail if the label H is not the same for all users (recall that we have assumed
a collision-resistant hash function for the computation of H).
Once S has recovered all the passwords of the attacked users, he asks a CompatiblePwd query. If this
query returns incorrect, we continue the simulation as in G2 (we show in G6 how to deal with this case
without using the passwords of the users).











Recall that the passwords of the honest users were chosen at random, so there is no chance that they
should be compatible with the (common) public key. S thus keeps its `   1 ￿rst passwords and computes
a replacement value g
f pw
0




In the second round, the simulator must produce commitments that are compatible with the public
key. To do so, he makes commitments on the same random passwords as before for the `   1 ￿rst honest
users, and for the last one creates a commitment as an ElGamal encryption of g
f pw
0
i`. He sends them all
out. In the same round, the simulator must also produce another series of password commitments, this
time as ElGamal encryptions of cpwi and not gpwi.
We now have to consider two cases. First, suppose that the group leader is attacked. The simulator
computes the commitments normally for the ￿rst ` 1 honest players using the simulated passwords. For
the last player Pi`, he asks a Computation query along with a Delivery query in order to recover csk, and
computes the missing commitment as an ElGamal encryption of c
f pw
00













Otherwise, if the group leader is not attacked, the simulator will not recover csk. We thus proceed as
in G3, using an incorrect value c
pwij for the group leader (if ij is its index among the uncorrupted players).
S sends out the commitments along with the proofs of consistency. Note that in the second case he
will prove a false statement for the group leader.
The simulator then continues the game honestly, by choosing random values i and i and executing
the four rings as described in the protocol. Everything goes well if the group leader is attacked. Otherwise,
the last step fails, without any bad consequence on the protocol since the group leader ends the ring (as
in G3). The bit b is chosen as described in G2: if something goes wrong and the protocol halts, then b = 0,
otherwise b = 1.
Since the commitments are computationally hiding under the DDH assumption, the adversary cannot
become aware that the passwords are not the good ones, or that the password for the user Pi` changed
between the two rounds of commitments. This game is indistinguishable from G4.
Game G6: Simulation in case of incompatible passwords in presence of an adversary.
This game starts exactly as in G5. We now suppose that the CompatiblePwd query returns incor-
rect. Since the veri￿cation step will fail, S can keep all the values f pwi1;:::; f pwi` for the second round of
25commitments (in base g as in base c). He then sends these commitments along with the corresponding
proofs.
He then continues honestly the protocol (without knowing the real passwords of the users) until it
fails, at the veri￿cation step. The simulator then asks a Computation query, and a Delivery query with bit
b = 0. For the same reasons than in the former game, G6 is indistinguishable from G5.
Game G7: Indistinguishability with the ideal world.
We have shown that S is able in any case to simulate the whole protocol without using the passwords
of the users. Thus, we can now suppose that he does not know these passwords.
The only di￿erence between G6 and G7 is that the CompatiblePwd query is replaced by a testPwd
query to the functionality, the Computation by a Decryption query and the Delivery by a Leader Decryption
Delivery query. If a session aborts or terminates, S reports it to A. If a session terminates with a message m,
then S makes a Delivery call to the functionality, specifying a bit b = 1. If the protocol fails, he gives a bit
b = 0.
We now show that this last game G7 is indistinguishable from the ideal-world experiment IWE. More
precisely, we have to show that the group leader receives a correct message in G7 if and only if it receives
a correct message in the ideal world.
First, if the users share compatible passwords, the same public key, the same ciphertext, and all the
￿ows are oracle-generated until the end of the game, then the group leader will obtain a correct message,
both in G7 (from G3) and the ideal world, as there are no testPwd queries and the sessions remain fresh.
Second, if they share compatible passwords, the same public key, the same ciphertext, and if there are
some impersonation attempts but the adversary plays honestly, then the group leader will also receive a
correct message (from G5). Third, if they do not share compatible passwords or if some received ￿ows
di￿er from one user to an other, then the group leader will get an error.
This establishes that, given any adversary A that attacks the protocol  in the real world, we can
build a simulator S that interacts with the functionality F in the ideal world, in such a way that the
environment cannot distinguish which world it is in.
C Simulation-Sound Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We brie￿y review how we can e￿ciently build our SSNIZK proofs in the random oracle model [4]. Note
that we only need to prove two kinds of languages:
￿ equality of discrete logarithms, that is, for a tuple (g;h;G;H) 2 G4, one wants to prove that CDH(g;G;
h;H), knowing k such that G = gk and H = hk;
￿ ElGamal encryption of 0 or 1, that is an OR-proof of equality of discrete logarithms. Given a tuple
(g;h;G;H) 2 G4, one indeed wants to prove that CDH(g;G;h;H) or CDH(g;G;h;H=g), knowing k
such that G = gk and H = hk (for an encryption of 0) or H = ghk (encryption of 1).
We will also allow a label ` to be included in the proof, and in the veri￿cation.
C.1 Equality of Discrete Logarithms
Given (g;h;G = gk;H = hk),
￿ one ￿rst chooses r
R   Z
q, and computes G0 = gr and H0 = hr;
￿ one then generates the challenge c = H(`;g;h;G;H;G0;H0) 2 Zq;
￿ one ￿nally computes s = r   kc mod q;
26The proof consists of the tuple (c;s).
In order to verify the proof, one ￿rst computes the expected values for G0 and H0 respectively: G00 =
gsGc and H00 = hsHc; and then checks that c
? = H(`;g;h;G;H;G00;H00).
This proof is a SSNIZK proof [21], in the random oracle model.
C.2 ElGamal Encryption of 0 or 1
We now want to combine two of the proofs above, in order to show that one of them is true: given
(g;h;G;H), we want to show that there exists k such that G = gk and either H = hk or H = ghk. Let us
assume that H = gbhk, for b 2 f0;1g.
￿ one ￿rst chooses rb
R   Zq and computes G0
b = grb and H0
b = hrb;
￿ one also chooses c b;s b 2 Zq, and computes G0
 b = gs bGc b, as well as H0
 b = hs b(H=g
 b)c b;





￿ one computes cb = c   c b mod q, and sb = rb   kcb mod q
The proof consists of the tuple (c0;c1;s0;s1).






0 = gs0Gc0, H00
0 = hs0Hc0; G00
1 = gs1Gc1, and H00
1 = hs1(H=g)c1, and then checks that c0 + c1
? =
H(`;g;h;G;H;G00
0;H00
0;G00
1;H00
1).
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